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One Sentence Summary: Regional agent-based scenario simulations of the
COVID-19 outbreak in South Africa suggest that countermeasures in many
countries of the Global South are required to be especially rapid and severe
to not overload the capacity set by locally available intensive care units.
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COVID-19 has spread from China across Europe and the United States and
has become a global pandemic. In countries of the Global South, due to often
weaker socioeconomic options and health care systems, effective local counter-
measures remain debated. We combine large-scale socioeconomic and traffic
survey data with detailed agent-based simulations of local transportation to
analyze COVID-19 spreading in a regional model for the Nelson Mandela Bay
Municipality in South Africa under a range of countermeasure scenarios. The
simulations indicate that any realistic containment strategy, including those
similar to the one ongoing in South Africa, may yield a manifold overload of
available intensive care units (ICUs). Only immediate and the most severe
countermeasures, up to a complete lock-down that essentially inhibits all joint
human activities, can contain the epidemic effectively. As South Africa ex-
hibits rather favorable conditions compared to many other countries of the
Global South, our findings constitute rough conservative estimates and may
support identifying strategies towards containing COVID-19 as well as any
major future pandemics in these countries.
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The first cases of the corona virus disease COVID-19 were confirmed on December 29, 2019
in China (1). Due to high contagiousness (2), the disease has spread rapidly (3,4) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) has since confirmed (5) about 1.6 million cases worldwide, with
its vast majority as of this writing (April 11, 2020) in the United States and many countries in
Europe. Most countries of the Global South are affected as well, often with reported case num-
bers just beginning to surge (6). However, the currently reported low numbers, e.g. about 9000
cases in all of Africa, may be biased as only few individuals have been tested, see (7) for the
example of South Africa, and also (8). Furthermore, such countries operate under vastly differ-
ent socio-economic conditions, with larger social inequality, distinct transportation options and
weaker health care systems compared to those of most countries in the global north (9–11), such
that core characteristics of potential COVID-19 spreading dynamics and thus the effectiveness
of specific countermeasures remain largely unknown for countries of the Global South.
The transmission of COVID-19 is currently thought to occur through direct inter-person
droplet-based infections through coughing and sneezing, with possible additional infection
paths through aerosols and via contaminated surfaces. Symptoms often occur only after an
incubation period of several days, with many infected responding entirely asymptomatic. Con-
tagion may also occur via such symptom-free carriers, posing a challenge for tracing and esti-
mating spreading patterns (12). Transmission predominantly occurs through interactions while
being at home, being at work, using shared transportation modes or during group-based leisure
activities. In many countries of the Global South, most of these social activities occur under con-
ditions drastically different from those in, for example, Europe or the U.S.. For instance, these
countries feature, on average, more people per household, higher unemployment rates, more
manual and lower payed work (13, 14) and much of publicly available transportation services
used by the middle and low-income population are offered as paratransit shared-mobility ser-
vices (15, 16). Moreover, public health care services are different and often less well equipped
3
than in countries of the Global North (11,17).
As a paradigmatic region offering large-scale data availability, we consider the Nelson Man-
dela Bay Municipality (NMBM) in South Africa to study scenarios of COVID-19 spreading dy-
namics and the impact of countermeasures. We combine socio-economic and travel survey data
from more than 100,000 people (18), about 10% of the local population, based on employment
status, household size, age group and income level together with a detailed 24-hour travel diary
component integrated into an agent-based traffic simulation (see Materials and Methods). The
resulting contact network forms the basis for extended Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR)
model dynamics with parameters adapted to COVID-19 (19). Such agent-based simulations
capture the inhomogeneity among the agents and are capable of modeling intricate nonlinear
dynamic relationships between them, including a spreading rate that depends on the individ-
ual agent’s detailed activities, their modes of transportation used, and their distance to each
other (20).
To evaluate the impact of various policy measures on the course of the disease, we system-
atically compare several scenarios by varying simulation parameters accordingly (see Materials
and Methods). First, a baseline scenario without any countermeasures; second, a default sce-
nario in line with the current measures implemented in South Africa as of early April 2020 (21).
These include the shutdown of childcare and educational institutions, the prohibition of leisure
activities of any kind and cutting shopping activity options by about 70 %. Moreover, work
related and “other” activities (for example trips to health care facilities and visits to public in-
stitutions) and travelling as passenger in a car are reduced by 80 % and formal and informal
public transport is reduced by 30 %. Third, as a harsher variation of the lockdown that may
be achievable in principle, we study the effect of a realistic lockdown scenario, increasing the
restriction of activities related to work, shopping, leisure, and “other” by 90 % while childcare,
educational activities as well as formal and informal public transport are completely shut down.
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Finally, we consider a theoretical complete lockdown where all travel and outside activities are
prohibited.
All countermeasures come into effect 7 days after an initial infection of 100 people. We
furthermore investigate additional simulations that start with the (currently enacted) default
measures and introduce the realistic lockdown scenario after a number of days. The results pre-
sented below may inform and complement the ongoing discussion around tightening, loosening,
introducing or repealing certain countermeasures.
Direct model simulations in the four scenarios (Figure 1) reveal that a large fraction of the
population becomes infected, not only for the baseline scenario without countermeasures (as
expected), but also with the default countermeasures active as of this writing (April 11 2020),
see Figure panels 1A and 1B. Even if scenarios of harsh but realistically possible or complete
lockdown were enacted only seven days after reaching 100 infected people, the outbreaks would
still become macroscopic, with tens of thousands of infected people (Figure 1C and 1D) in the
NMBM alone. Across all scenarios enacted, outbreak dynamics also causes overload of the
approximately ICU beds estimated as baseline for NMBM (Figure 1E,F). As a precondition for
successful containment, lockdown needs to be implemented sufficiently early on (in particular
less than 7 days after the first 100 infected, not the first 100 confirmed infected).
In all four scenarios, the outbreak strongly overloads the available intensive care unit (ICU)
beds, with ten- to 100-fold overload in default and baseline scenario, respectively (see Figure
2A). Out of the total 267 ICU beds available in (public and private) hospitals in the whole
Eastern Cape Province (data from 2008, (22)), only about 50 would be available for critical
cases from the NMBM (scaled proportional to the relative population counts in 2011 (23, 24)).
We additionally quantify the sustained pressure on the health care system by computing the
cumulative overload λ of the health system as the total number of person days critical patients
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go without intensive care (Figure 2B),
λ =
∫
Θ(c(t)− cmax) [c(t)− cmax] dt
where Θ(·) denotes the Heaviside step function, Θ(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0 and Θ(x) = 0 otherwise,
c(t) the number of critical cases at time t and cmax the available ICU capacity. The integral is
taken over the entire time of simulation, 64 days after the 100 people are infected in NMBM.
This cumulative measure λ thus quantifies the total long term overload of intensive care health
services (and may be large even if the peak overload is small).
The potential severity of the outbreak in NMBM even with strong countermeasures, is espe-
cially evident when compared to that of the United Kingdom (UK) (Figure 2C). In the UK, ICU
capacity would be exceeded by a factor of about 35 without any countermeasures, by factor of
about 2 with social distancing (similar to default in our simulations) and not at all with measures
currently enacted (25). In our NMBM scenario simulations, ICU capacity would be exceeded
by a factor of more than 200 without any countermeasures, by factor of about 20 with default
measures, by a factor of 5 with realistic lockdown and still by a factor of 3 even with complete
lockdown. These numbers underline the strong fragility of the health care services by example
of the NMBM. We expect similar orders of magnitude of capacity exceedance throughout South
Africa and in many countries of the Global South.
Therefore, all realistic scenarios, including the default scenario currently enacted in South
Africa, hardly seem capable of containing the COVID-19 pandemic without substantially over-
loading ICU availability. Our results suggest that such overload could even be expected if all
the 267 ICU beds in both private and public hospitals within the entire Eastern Cape Province
would be exclusively available for critical COVID-19 patients in the Nelson Mandela Bay Mu-
nicipality only.
Realistic or complete lockdown offer options of greatly reducing the pressure on the health
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care system if enacted rapidly enough. However, economic boundary conditions and in partic-
ular the large inequality in South Africa – and similarly in many other countries of the Global
South – pose additional problems. Thus, in our opinion, in particular complete lockdown seems
hardly enforceable and would appear unsustainable especially for a large share of people with
lower income, as already weaker containment will likely lead to severe economic consequences
in addition to disease related deaths (26,27).
How can the number of critical cases be confined given that the default scenario is already
enacted? On April 9th, 2020, the number of cases reported in NMBM was 30 (28). As the
number of reported cases seem to systematically underestimate their actual number by at least a
factor of three, as predicted for Austria on April 10, 2020 (8), we estimate that on 9th of April, at
least 100 cases existed in NMBM and take that as our initial condition. Starting simulations with
the default scenario active, we find that critical cases are likely to vastly exceed the available
ICU capacity (Figure 3A) within two months. In contrast, introducing the realistic lockdown
scenario immediately, i.e. starting April 13th, might support a successful confinement of the
number of critical COVID-19 patients in NMBM to manageable numbers (Figure 3B). In this
scenario, the simulations suggest that there is about 80% likelihood that ICU capacity becomes
overloaded at some time and that ,if overload occurs, it will be relatively mild (factor of 2-3 of
the capacity, in contrast to factor of about 30 when keeping the default measures as they are).
We remark that the success of such lockdown countermeasures crucially relies on several re-
strictions and our simulations likely under- rather than overestimate future case numbers. First
in our simulations, activities are immediately reduced to the set low values (complete shutdown
of public transport, child care and educational facilities, 90% reduction of all other activities)
and all inhabitants fully comply with these restrictions. Second, our simulations are based on
estimated parameters that thereby come with uncertainties, and stochastic dynamics may create
large deviations from the predicted values, in particular also earlier growth and larger total num-
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ber of critical patients, not last due to an exponential growth of the outbreak in its initial phase
without severe lockdown (compare (29)). Third, our estimates assume that all ICU beds would
be available exclusively for COVID-19 patients during the entire time of the outbreak. Those
and other constraints call for a more conservative, especially earlier introduction of realistic
countermeasures.
Across all scenarios studied, the results thus indicate that it may be hard to enact realistic,
socially and economically feasible countermeasures without exceeding ICU capacity and that
more drastic measures beyond the current default are rapidly needed. Finally, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the consequences of countermeasures would be qualitatively the same
across South Africa as well as many countries of the Global South.
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Fig. 1. Distinct outbreak scenarios of COVID-19. Dynamics for the Nelson Mandela Bay
Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa, with a total population of 1.15 million people. (A-D)
Evolution of the number of infected (dotted lines), seriously sick (dashed) and critical (solid)
patients in four different scenarios: (A) baseline without any countermeasures, (B) with default
countermeasures in line with current conditions in South Africa, (C) with harsh realistic coun-
termeasures shutting down 90% of all activities, and (D) with complete lockdown prohibiting
any movement and group activities (infections within a household are still possible, see Supple-
mentary Material for details). All countermeasures are initiated 7 days (grey shading) after the
an initial infection of 100 people. (E) and (F) Number of critical cases requiring intensive care
compared to the available ICU capacity (horizontal dashed line) for all four countermeasure
scenarios. None of the scenarios reduces the number of critical cases sufficiently to guarantee
intensive care (ICU) treatment for all critical patients.
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Fig. 2. Overload of the health care system. (A) Maximum number of concurrent critical
patients during the peak of the outbreak. The available ICU capacity (dashed line) is widely
exceeded in all scenarios. (B) The measure λ for the sustained overload, counting the total
number of person days that critical patients are without intensive care. (C) Relative exceedance
of the ICU capacity at the peak of the outbreak. The potential consequences of COVID-19 in
countries of the Global South becomes clear from the comparison to UK estimates (25) with
about 35-fold overload without interventions (UK baseline, upper dotted line) and no overload
with UK lockdown (lower dotted line) enforcing school and university closure, case isolation
and general social distancing. Note the logarithmic vertical axes in all panels to make vast case
number differences visible simultaneously with the capacity.
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Fig. 3. Confining the impact by rapid lockdown. Ten stochastic realizations of agent-based
simulations (gray lines in (A) and (B)) show increasing typical number of critical cases, quanti-
fied by the ensemble mean (dark) and median (light). (A) Stochastic dynamics of the number of
critical cases when keeping the currently active default measures in NMBM. The ICU capacity
is exceeded in almost all realizations within two months. (B) Switching from default (currently
roughly enacted in South Africa) to the realistic lockdown scenario, limiting all activity by
90%, four days after crossing 100 infected people (estimated from 30 actually reported cases)
in NMBM (that is on April 13, 2020), yields an exceeded ICU capacity in 80% of realizations, at
most five times above the available capacity. (C) Relative exceedance of available ICU capacity
in both scenarios. Keeping a default would cause roughly 3000% overload whereas enacting a
stricter lockdown on April 13th substantially reduces expected overload to less than 300% and
may completely avoid an overload in best cases.
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Materials and Methods
Transport simulation
For the transport simulation, we employ the latest version (version 12.0-SNAPSHOT) of MAT-
Sim (30). The analysis relies on the population data file provided by Joubert (18). It processes
travel diaries from the 2004 Travel Survey to compute a synthetic population sample of the
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). Table S1 outlines the descriptive statistics of the
synthetic agents and the modal split. It becomes apparent that the minibus taxis are the back-
bone of the regions transport system. Private transport such as passenger cars play a rather
marginal role. This difference underlines the interdependence of geographical, historical and
economic characteristics of the region.
Variables Values
Number of Agents (10 % Sample) 114.346
Number of minibus taxis (DRT) 2300
Number of Legs with mode:
Walk 208.694
Minibus taxi 104.730
Car (driver) 20.257
Car (non-driving passenger) 21.803
Train 265
Bike 158
Table S1: Descriptive Statistics of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality population sam-
ple. The 114.346 agents represent a 10% sample of the total population of NMBM. The trip
distribution by transport mode shows the high prevalence of low cost transport modes (walk and
minibus taxi) compared to private car usage. (Data from (18,31)))
We employ the Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) framework for MATSim (32) to in-
clude the informal minibus taxi transit. In the underpinning MATSim, agents walk to a bus stop
and request a DRT vehicle (in this case a minibus taxi). Their ride is pooled with rides of other
agents with similar destinations. The simulated routing is more flexible than in reality, since the
minibus taxis operate on a stop-based system with routes. Due to a lack of detailed data, this
mode was implemented based on a door-to-door based operating scheme and pick ups waiting
passengers from the stops. Consequently the vehicles are less frequented on the one hand but
travel longer distances with passengers on board to pick up customers in the city on the other.
This reduces the likelihood of being on a minibus with an infected person, but increases the
contact time if an infected person is actually on board. The formal bus transport services in
NMBM are provided by Algoa Bus Company (34). Due to limited data on frequencies and
schedules, the formerly bus passengers are assigned to the minibus taxis in the simulation.
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Transport parameters
Due to the 10 % population sample, the total capacity of the minibus taxis vehicles must be
adapted to reflect the proportions in reality. In 2014, a total of 2,374 minibus taxis operated in
NMBM with an average capacity of 15 persons (31). As scaling the capacity of minibus taxis
to 1.5 passengers would strongly underestimate the infections during minibus taxi trips, several
test scenarios with different fleet sizes and passenger capacities were carried out.
Due to the operating scheme of door-to-door DRT a reduction either in fleet size and/or
passenger capacity of the vehicles would lead to a high rejection rate and accordingly high
infection numbers at home facilities that could bias the simulation results. For this reason, the
number of vehicles has been chosen with respect to the trade-off between capacity utilisation
and the rejection rate. A fleet of 2,300 vehicles with a capacity of 15 optimises these criteria
and was introduced into the model. The vehicles were placed randomly in the area at the
beginning of the simulation, although in reality they wait for customers at designated places at
the beginning of the day and start their tour when a certain degree of occupancy is reached.
Public minibus taxis are assumed to take an important role in the epidemic simulation, as
both the probability and the intensity of contact are assumed to be high. Moreover, people with
different places of work and residence mix up at this small space.
Epidemic simulation
The model relies on the MATSim-based Episim-framework to simulate the epidemic spreading
in the research area. The following briefly summarises both the functionality of the default
Episim configuration and the parametric adaptions to the NMBN. It is important to note that the
package is still in a very early stage of development. For the following simulations, we used
the latest version (master in GitHub) dated April 11, 2020 (see also https://github.com/matsim-
org/matsim-episim).
Episim is based on a traditional SIR model, which is a common model for the analysis of
epidemics (35) and has been continuously improved, e.g. by (36–38). The basic mechanism is
that people go through different stages during an epidemic, and have different characteristics
with each transition. In short, initially all persons are susceptible for a disease and, over time,
become infected with a given probability, partly influenced by individual characteristics. Later
on, they recover. The states and transitions are usually extended to a more complex framework
and include quarantine, seriously sick and critical patients in order to account for policy mea-
sures and the need for either hospital beds or ICUs.
The infection process is based on a probabilistic model and occurs in “containers”. These
containers represent locations where several agents may interact, such as households, work-
places or transport vehicles, and are computed based on the information from NMBM MATSim
simulation output event data. These chronicle all trajectories covered by agents during the day
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and the vehicles and facilities they visited and stayed at. Once a susceptible and a contagious
agent stay in the same container, an infection occurs with a certain probability, which is de-
scribed by equation S1 (see below).
Epidemic parameters
At the beginning of the simulation, 10 randomly selected agents (corresponding to 100 people)
are initially infected. After 7 days of uncontrolled spread, various countermeasures are imple-
mented. We consider the dynamics until the countermeasures are in effect for 60 days.
In Episim, infected agents undergo several state transitions before their infection is termi-
nated. Since not all humans suffer equally from COVID-19, the agents follow different paths
from infection to recovery. In the beginning of the simulation, all agents except the ”Patients
Zero” are initially healthy and thus susceptible. After an infection, an agent’s state changes
to infected but not contagious, due to incubation time. With the beginning of the fourth day
after an infection, the agent’s state changes to contagious. From this step on, the agent’s differ
in their behaviour. In the default scenario, 20 % of the agents put themselves into quarantine.
The idea of the simulation model is that only a certain share of those suffering from COVID-
19 notices symptoms. In addition, it is to be expected that some infected persons will go into
public despite symptoms. The self-quarantine lasts 14 days and is assumed to mitigate social
contacts completely, even within the household. 4.5 % of all infected agents become seriously
sick on day 10 and of these, 25 % become critical the following day. In this way, a distinction is
made between patients who require regular medical care and those who are dependent on ICUs.
Contagious agents recover 16 days after infection, whereas the infection of patients with severe
conditions terminates after 23 days.
In reality, an infection would end by recovery or death. For usability reasons, every infected
agent recovers in Episim. As recovered agents are assumed to be immune and no longer con-
tagious, omitting death does not bias the further course. The same mechanism is applied for
self-quarantined, who remain mobile in the simulation but are neither contagious nor suscepti-
ble.
The probability of agent n becoming infected at time t when leaving a container is given by
Pn,t = 1− exp[−θ
∑
m
qm,tinm,tτnm,t] , (S1)
where q denotes the shedding rate (infectivity-parameter for the virus), i the contact intensity
and τ the interaction duration of two persons, summed over all persons in contact with agent n.
i is assumed to scale as d−3, thus declining very fast with increasing distance. θ is introduced
as a calibration parameter to shape the infection curve in a realistic way. Based on current in-
fection data a tenfold increase of infected persons in 7 days is quite realistic for most countries
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without any interventions. In our framework, we thus set θNMBM = 0.000003 in order to meet
this condition.
Most of the contact intensities were left at their default since it is reasonable to assume, that
the contact intensities of most activities do not differ significantly from the values determined
by (19). The activities work, shopping, dropby and other were introduced so that the first two
have the same contact intensity as leisure (5) and the other two take the values 7 and 3. It
is assumed that due to the available space and seating arrangements in the minibus taxis, the
contact between passengers in the minibus taxis is much higher than in formal public transport
in Berlin. Since no reliable data on the contact intensity of passengers are available, we take
the interaction intensity to be 20, compared to 10 in the default setting. Likewise, the contact
intensity of being at home is doubled from 3 to 6 due to limited space, larger households and
general living conditions.
Policy Parameters
The countermeasures in the default setting, realistic lockdown and complete lockdown are de-
scribed by modifiers to the activity rates of the agents, describing the reduction in the frequency
of the respective activity. Table S2 list all parameters for the scenarios studied.
Scenario Baseline Default Realistic Lockdown
Home 1 1 1 1
Work 1 0.2 0.1 0
Minibus taxis 1 0.7 0 0
Leisure 1 0 0.1 0
KiGa and Prim. Educ. 1 0 0 0
Higher Education 1 0 0 0
Shopping 1 0.3 0.1 0
Dropby 1 0 0 0
Other 1 0.2 0.1 0
Table S2: Allowed share per activity in 4 scenarios. Episim allows to prohibit or restrict the
practice of certain activities in order to simulate social distancing. Four sets of restrictions were
implemented in the simulations. While in the baseline scenarios no measures are in power, a
complete lockdown does not allow the population to leave their homes. Between those extreme
cases, two different partial lockdowns are set up.
5
Simulation results
Here we provide additional measures recorded from the simulations presented in the main
manuscript on the location of infection events (Table S3) and exact values of the health care
system overload (Table S4).
Scenario Baseline Default Realistic Lockdown
Scenarios with Minibus infection
Home 75,259 39,629 9,063 1,774
Work 2,188 919 171 5
Minibus taxis 16,002 3,705 799 18
Leisure 3,105 524 206 0
KiGa and Prim. Educ. 13,560 2,745 690 1
Higher Education 579 119 41 0
Shopping 915 549 26 0
Dropby 22 3 1 0
Other 2,210 621 99 4
Scenarios without Minibus infection
Home 83,747 17,421 3,417 1,091
Work 2,589 670 45 5
Minibus taxis 0 0 0 0
Leisure 4,075 392 91 0
KiGa and Prim. Educ. 16,581 2,068 142 2
Higher Education 822 74 8 0
Shopping 1,257 288 7 0
Dropby 28 1 0 0
Other 3,021 398 32 4
Table S3: Total number of infection events per location in the simulation scenarios. Each
event represents an initial infection of one out of 114.346 total agents. While most infections
occur at home due to prolonged and close contact, paratransit in terms of minibus taxis is the
second largest driver of the spreading process, accounting for approximately 15% of all infec-
tion events in the baseline scenario. These numbers decrease under countermeasures and almost
disappear under complete lockdown, where only a few people are initially infected before all
travel is stopped. A comparison to artificial settings where infections during minibus transit are
neglected demonstrate the importance of the minibus taxi service as a driver for the spreading,
in particular under partial lockdown.
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Scenario Baseline Default Realistic Lockdown
Scenarios with Minibus Infection
Peak Newly Infected per Day 128,870 15,510 2,370 2,350
Peak Seriously Sick 36,890 5,170 1,090 570
Peak Critical 10,280 990 260 170
Peak Critical Cases per ICU 205.6 19,8 5.2 3.4
λ 118,320 16,965 4,055 1,100
Days until first ICU Overload 18 21 20 20
Scenarios without Minibus Infection
Peak Newly Infected per Day 109,400 8,500 1,930 1,920
Peak Seriously Sick 34,720 2820 400 370
Peak Critical 9,030 750 130 120
Peak Critical Cases per ICU 180.6 15 2.6 2.4
λ 113,515 6,020 1,055 475
Days until first ICU Overload 20 26 24 23
Table S4: Exact values of health care system overload measures for all simulation scenarios.
During the first 6 days, the virus spreads uncontrolled. On day seven, countermeasures are
initiated that restricts certain activities (see S2). The upper values result from simulations in
which minibus taxis are possible locations of infection (presented in the main manuscript). The
lower values are drawn from simulations, in which people could not become infected in minibus
taxis (compare Table S3).
7
